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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
JANICE C. MARTIN, Widow, 
GAYLYNN MARTIN, MICH-
ELLE MARTIN, GARY 
CHADWICK, and VAL JAMES 
MARTIN, Minors by and 
through their Guardian Ad 
Litem, JANICE C. MARTIN, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
vs. 
LYNN D. CHRISTENSEN and 
FARMERS INSURANCE 
EXCHANGE, a California 
Corporation, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
Case oN. 
11450 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
Plaintiff, Janice C. Martin, was injured and 
her husband, Gary Martin, fatally injured in a motor 
vehicle pedestrian accident that occurred December 
1, 1967, in Salt Lake County, Utah. The driver of the 
vehicle, Lynn D. Christensen, who is a defendant in 
this action, was an uninsured motorist. At the time 
of this accident, Gary Martin owned two motor ve-
hicles and each vehicle was insured by the Farmers 
Insurance Exchange for uninsured motorist cover-
age. Two policies identical in language had been 
issued by the Farmers Insurance Exchange - the 
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only difference being the automobile described in 
each policy and the premium. The sole question pre-
sented by this case is the amount of insurance cover-
age available to plaintiffs. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Janice C. Martin on behalf of herself and as 
guardian of her minor children commenced suit in 
the District Court of Salt Lake County seeking dam-
ages for her personal injuries and damages for the 
death of her husband against Lynn D. Christensen 
and the Farmers Insurance Exchange. As noted 
above, Lynn D. Christensen, was an uninsured mo-
torist and the Farmers Insurance Exchange provides 
uninsured motorist coverage on two vehicles owned 
by decedent, Gary Martin. 
The complaint of plaintiff (R. 1-4) does not 
clearly specify the real issue in this case, but simply 
asks for judgment in the amount of Two Hundred 
Fifty Thousand ($250,000) Dollars for the death of 
1 
Gary Martin and Two Hundred Fifty Thousand 
( $250,000) Dollars for the injuries to Janice C. 
Martin. The uninsured motorist, Lynn D. Christen-
sen, did not answer or otherwise appear in the action. 
Defendant, (respondent) Farmers Insurance Ex-
change answered the complaint of the plaintiff; ad-
mitted that it provided uninsured motorist coverage 
to plaintiffs; denied generally the other allegations of 
the complaint; and specifically requested that the 
Court determine and declare that the amount of un-
2 
insured motorist coverage available to plaintiffs un-
der their contract with Farmers Insurance Exchange 
was limited to Ten Thousand ($10,000) Dollars for 
the death of Gary Martin, and Ten Thousand ($10,-
000) Dollars for injuries sustained by Janice C. 
Martin ( R 5-8). At the same time, respondent, Farm-
ers Insurance Exchange, offered to permit a judg-
ment to be entered against it in the amount of 
Twenty Thousand ( $20,000) Dollars, the amount of 
coverage it claimed owing to plaintiffs (R. 16) and 
moved the Court for a Summary Judgment declaring 
that the total amount of Twenty Thousand ( $20,000) 
Dollars was the ultimate legal responsibility of 
Farmers Insurance Exchange to plaintiffs. There-
upon the plaintiffs moved the Court for a Summary 
Judgment (R 18) asking the Court to hold that the 
ultimate legal responsibility of the Farmers Insur-
ance Exchange was Forty Thousand ($40,000) Dol-
lars. The real issue in the case was thus joined. 
Based upon the clear unequivocal language of 
the contractual provisions of the two insurance con-
tracts, the Lower Court granted the Motion of Farm-
ers Insurance Exchange. Plaintiffs prosecute this 
Appeal from that Order and Judgment. 
3 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiffs seek a reversal of the Judgment and 
Judgment in their favor as a matter of Law. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondent agrees generally with the facts 
stated in the Brief of Appellant. However, Respon-
dent does not agree with the conclusion stated therein 
that the Lower Court erred in granting Respondents 
Motion for Summary Judgment. On the contrary as 
will be pointed out in the Points of Argument, the 
Judgment of the Lower Court is correct. 
4 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE LOWER COURT PROPERLY GRANTED A 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT TO FARMERS INSURANCE 
EXCHANGE HOLDING THAT THE TOTAL AMOUNT 
OF INSURANCE COVERAGE AVAILABLE WAS TEN 
THOUSAND ($10,000) DOLLARS FOR A SINGLE IN-
JURY AND TWENTY THOUSAND ($20,000) DOLLARS 
FOR A SINGLE ACCIDENT. 
As noted above and in the Brief of Appellant, 
Gary Martin owned two automobiles and each was 
insured by Farmers Insurance Exchange under sep-
arate insurance contracts, identical however, in their 
terms. Each of the policies issued to Gary Martin 
contained General Conditions. The condition pertin-
ent to the legal question in this case reads: 
(7) OTHER INSURANCE IN THE COM-
PANY 
"With respect to any occurrence, accident or loss 
to which this and any other insurance policy or 
policies issued to the insured by the Company 
also apply, no payment shall be made hereunder 
which, when added to any amount paid or pay-
able under such other insurance policy or poli-
cies, wo uld result in a total payment to the in-
sured or any other person in excess of the high-
est applicable limit of liability under any one 
such policy." (R. 13-15) 
The language of the quoted condition is clear 
and unequivocal. It says very succinctly and precisely 
that if an insured has other applicable coverage with 
the company that payment for loss shall not exceed 
5 
the single highest limit under any one policy. It is ' 
admitted by plaintiffs that both policies issued 
to Gary Martin had identical uninsured motorist 
coverage and that each policy contains the condition 
set forth above. 
The quoted condition is not unique to the policies 
issued by Respondent, Farmers Insurance Exchange. 
This condition, or one of similar import, is contained 
in every automobile liability policy written in this 
Country. There may be some exceptions but Respon- ' 
dent has not been able to locate any. The Court will 
find that automobile liability insurance contracts will 
generally follow a standard form in use throughout 
the insurance industry. From time to time, over the 
years, the standard form will be changed to meet 
changing coverages and changing conditions. These 
various standard policies have been compiled in a 
work by Risjord and Austin entitled "Automobile 
Liability Insurance Cases." The condition we quote 
above came into being in the 1959 standard policy. 
1 
As a matter of common knowledge we know that over 
the years it has become customary for the average 
American family to have two and perhaps more cars 
in the family. It is also very usual and standard for 
these family automobiles to be insured by the same 
insurance company. The reason is that it is conven-
ient for a family to deal with one insurance agent 
and in most cases, as was the case here, the family 
receives a discount when more than one automobile 
is insured with the company. In the Martin case on 
6 
Policy No. 6643-00-14, the single car premium was 
$67.80; with the second car discount the premium 
was $52.52. On Policy No. 6643-12-14, the single car 
premium is $72.10 and with the second car discount 
the premium was $61.70. 
The quoted condition was adopted to specifically 
meet the growing situation where there was more 
than one automobile in the family and to prevent 
multiple or pyramiding insurance limits. An illus-
tration at this point may be helpful. Assume a person 
is driving a borrowed vehicle with the permission 
of the owner. This driver also has two vehicles of 
his own insured by the same insurance company un-
der separate policies. He gets in an accident and 
causes personal injuries to the driver of another ve-
hicle. Assume further that there is Ten Thousand 
($10,000) Dollars coverage on the vehicle he is driv-
ing and Ten Thousand ($10,000) Dollars coverage 
on each of his automobiles. It is uniformly held that 
the coverage on the vehicle involved in the accident is 
primary and that other insurance on the driver is 
excess. But, the further question in this illustration 
is just how much excess insurance is there? Does the 
insurance on just one of the vehicles owned by the 
driver apply, or, does the insurance on both vehicles 
apply? The insurance industry elected to resolve this 
question by the adoption of contractual language 
of the quoted condition. In the illustration given, 
under the language of the condition, the insured 
driver would have available to him the coverage on 
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the vehicle he was operating as well as the highest 
single limit on the two vehicles he owns. 
As indicated, the purpose of the condition is to 
resolve in advance any question that might arise con-
cerning the amount of coverage available where the 
insured has more than one car insured in the com-
pany. 
So far as can be now ascertained this insurance 
condition Jias never been before a Court of Last Re-
sort in this Country. The decision of this Court then, 
concerning this condition, will be a "landmark" de-
cision and certainly of more than a passing interest 
to the insurance industry. 
Respondent does not view the problem in this 1 
case as one of construction or interpretation of 
language. The language of the condition is very clear 
and very understandable. The issue is whether the 
Respondent, and for that matter the insurance in-
dustry, has a right to limit its ultimate liability for a 
single loss. 
The applicable general textbook authority is 
set forth in Volume 29, American Jurisprudence 
(Insurance-Section 227.) It reads: 
"In the absence of a statutory provision to the 
contrary, an insurance company may limit its 
liability and impose restrictions and limitations 
on its contractual obligations not inconsistent 
with public policy." 
This general principle has been approved in nu-
merous jurisdictions. 
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The Utah case of Jones vs. New York Life, 69 
Utah, 172, 253 Pac. 200, involved an application for 
a life insurance policy. The proposed insured in this 
case had completed an application and had been ex-
amined by a doctor. He was approved by the com-
pany for a policy and the policy had actually been 
issued and delivered to the agent. However, before 
the premium had been paid the proposed insured had 
been examined by a doctor and it was found that he 
was suffering from meningitis and that he died with-
in a few days thereafter. The application provided 
that there would be no insurance if the proposed in-
sured had consulted a physician prior to the payment 
of the premium. The Court ruled that insurance con-
tract had not come into force by reason of the breach 
of conditions set forth in the application. The Court 
stated in part: 
"It was within the rights of, and was competent 
for, the parties to provide in the application un-
der what conditions and at what time the policy 
should become effective." 
Certainly if an insurance company can legally 
contract and condition the effect of its policy of in-
surance it has the legal power to limit the extent and 
amount of liability for which it will be responsible. 
New York Li/ e vs. West, 82 Pac. 2d, 754 
(Colo.): 
"It seems clear to us that it is within neither the 
intention nor the power of the Legislature or the 
Courts to compel an insurance company to write 
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a J?Olicy, or preve~t it fr?m limiting a policy 
written to any specific accident or class of acci-
dents." 
C.P.A. Company vs. Jones, 263 Pac. 2d, 731 
(Okla.) 
"It is well established that an insurance com-
pany may limit the risks for which it is respon-
sible." 
Trinity Universal Insurance Company vs. Will-
rich, 124 Pac. 2d, 950 (Wash.) 
"The relation between an insurer and an insured 
is purely a contractual one .... It is axiomatic 
that competent persons may make such a con-
tract for insurance as they may see fit, provided 
that it does not contravene any provision of sta-
tutory law and is not opposed to public policy .... 
It follows, therefore, that in the absence of some 
statutory provision to the contrary, an insurance 
company may seek to limit its liability and to 
impose restrictions and limitations upon its con-
tractual obligations not inconsistent with public 
policy." 
The undoubted right of the insurance company 
to limit its liability is conditioned only upon con-
siderations of public policy or statutory law. 
At this point it is well to consider the Utah case 
of Russell vs. Paulson, 18 Utah 2d, 157, 417 Pac. 2d, 
658, which is an uninsured motorist coverage case 
and is clearly analogous to the case at bar. In that 
case a passenger in a vehicle was injured by an unin-
sured motorist. There was uninsured motorist cov-
10 
erage on the vehicle in which she was riding and she 
was also entitled to the same type of coverage on her 
family automobile. The insurer on the automobile 
in which she was riding settled her claim for $4,500 
without answering the suit. She thereupon obtained 
a default judgment against the administrator of the 
estate of the uninsured motorist in the amount of 
$10,000. Summary judgment was granted to the 
plaintiff against her own insurer for the sum of 
$5.000. 
On appeal this Court reversed the summary 
judgment and in its holding extensively discussed 
the "excess clause" and "pro-rata clause" contained 
in the two insurance policies. The Court stated in 
part: 
"The reasoning of the Oregon Court is persuas-
ive, but we are constrained to adopt the majority 
rule which imposes primary liability of the "pro-
rata Insurer" and secondary liability on the "ex-
cess insurer".' 
The Court stated further: 
This Court has seriously considered the reason-
ing in both the Smith and Burcham cases and 
can find no compelling reason for departing from 
the majority rule as stated in Burcham. The 
applicable limits of liability in both Russell's and 
Gritton's policy were $5,000 per person. Thus 
the applicable limits of the Russell policy did not 
exceed the applicable limits of Gritton's policy. 
The language is free and clear of ambiguity, 
that since the limits of Russell's policy did not 
exceed Gritton's excess coverage cannot be ap-
plied in Russell's pdlicy." 
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In so holding this Court cited with approval, 
1 
language from the leading case of Burcham vs. 
Farmers Insurance Exchange, 121 No. West, 2d 500 
(1963 - Iowa.) 
Discussing the majority rule preferring the 
excess clause over the pro-rata clause, our Court 
quotes the Burcham case, supra, as fallows: 
"The basis for so holding is not always clear. It 
may, however, be justified on what is a rational 
basis of the intent of the insurance industry in 
its use of such clauses to set up order of pay-
ment and limit amounts payable to prevent dou-
ble recovery." 
Our Court is with the majority of Courts in the 
interpretation and effect given the "excess clause" 
and the "pro-rata clause" contained in automobile 
liability insurance policy. The effect of "Condition 7" 
in the Farmers Insurance Exchange policy is to reach 
the same result where the same insurance company 
issues two policies to the same person or family as 
where two different insurance companies cover the 
same loss and their rights and responsibilities are set 
forth in the "excess and pro-rata clauses." 
Respondent submits that the reasoning of the 
Russell case, supra, quoting extensively from the 
Iowa case of Burcham, supra, is controlling on the 
case at bar. To reverse the Lower Court would be 
to cast doubt upon the reasoning of the Russell case 
supra. Respondent is asking the Court to affirm the 
judgment of the Lower Court. 
12 
"on what is a rational basis of the intent of the 
insurance industry in its use of such clauses 
(Condition 7) to set up order of payment and 
limit amounts payable to prevent double recov-
ery." 
13 
POINT II. 
CONDITION 7 OF THE INSURANCE CONTRACT 
DOES NOT VIOLATE UTAH LAW OR CONTRAVENE 
THE ESTABLISHED PUBLIC POLICY OF THE STATE. 
As indicated under the preceding Point an in-
surance company may legally limit its liability sub-
ject only to positive statutory command and estab-
lished public policy. 
Appellant does not argue that Condition 7 of the 
insurance contract violates any statutory prohibition, 
but Appellant does argue that Condition 7 does frus-
trate the intent of the uninsured motorist provisions 
of Utah Law, and is contrary to public policy. 
The reverse is true. Condition 7 is in complete 
harmony with the Law and public policy of the State 
of Utah relative to uninsured motorist coverage. 
The provision of our Code relative to uninsured 
motorist coverage is Title 41-12-21.1 adopted by the 
legislature in 1967. This statute reads: 
"Commencing on July 1, 1967, no automobile 
liability insurance policy insuring against loss 
resulting from liability imposed by law for bod-
ily injury or death or property damage suffered 
by any person arising out of the ownership, 
maintenance or use of a motor vehicle, shall be 
delivered, issued for delivery, or renewed in this 
state, with respect to any motor vehicle regis-
tered or principally garaged in this state, unless 
coverage is provided in such policy or a supple-
ment to it, in limits for bodily injury or death 
set forth in section 41-12-5, under provisions 
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filed with and approved by the state insurance 
commission for the protection of persons insured 
thereunder who are legally entitled to recover 
damages from owners or operators of uninsured 
motor vehicles and hit-and-run motor vehicles 
because of bodily injury, sickness or disease, in-
cluding death, resulting therefrom. The named 
insured shall have the right to reject such cover-
age, and unless the named insured requests such 
coverage in writing, such coverage need not be 
provided in a renewal policy or a supplement to 
it where the named insured had rejected the 
coverage in connection with a policy previously 
issued to him by the same insurer." 
The purpose of this legislation was to allevi-
ate the economic burden cast upon the injured by the 
uninsured motorist. It was also designed in part to 
head off a demand for compulsory automobile insur-
ance. This is a more desirable method because States 
that have compulsory automobile insurance have 
found that such a Law drives the cost of insurance 
premiums up to prohibitive levels. 
The statute demands that a limit of $10,000 and 
$20, 000 for a single accident be provided by the 
policy under conditions approved by the State Insur-
ance Commission. These are the amounts provided 
in the policies in this case and there is no evidence 
that the form of policy has not been approved by the 
Insurance Commission. 
Rather than frustrate the provisions of this sec-
tion of the Code the policies in question conform ex-
actly to it. This statute embodies the public policy of 
15 
this State relative to uninsured motorists and insur-
ance coverage therefor and the insurance policies in 
this case are not in opposition to the Law in any re-
spect. Plaintiffs in this case have been afforded the 
amount of protection provided by the statute and in 
fact the full statutory limit has been offered to them 
in settlement. 
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POINT III. 
FARMERS INSURANCE EXCHANGE HAS NOT 
WAIVED ANY PROVISION OR CONDITION OF ITS 
POLICIES. 
The Farmers Insurance Exchange has not 
waived condition 7 of the policy by issuing two poli-
cies and by accepting the premium therefor as con-
tended by appellants. Appellants cite no facts that 
would indicate a waiver in this case and the only 
authority cited is 28 American Jurisprudence 2d, 
Estoppel and ·waiver, Section 162. That Section 
merely states that: 
" (a) rights secured by contract may be waived 
" 
No-one can quarrel with that principle but it has 
no application to this case. 
Appellant should also be made aware of Condi-
tion 3 set forth in the insurance contracts which 
reads as follows: 
(3) CHANGES: 
"Notice to any agent or knowledge possessed by 
any agent or by any other person shall not effect 
a waiver or a change in any part of this policy 
or estop the Company from asserting any right 
under the terms of this policy; nor shall the 
terms of this policy be waived or changed, ex-
cept by endorsement issued to form a party of 
this policy." (R. 14) 
Waiver is generally defined in Law as "volun-
17 
tary and intentional relinquishment of a known 
right." 
28 American Jurisprudence, Estopel and Wai-
ver, Section 154. 
There is no evidence in this case of a waiver, ex- ' 
press or implied, and the very terms of the insurance 
contract negative any such intention on the part of 
Farmers Insurance Exchange. Had there been an 
endorsement waiving this policy term appellants 
should produce it. Respondent assures the court that 1 
no such endorsement exists. 
18 
.. 
CONCLUSION 
Condition 7 of the insurance contracts in issue 
in this case limit the liability of the insurance com-
pany on any one loss to the highest single limt of any 
one policy. Conditions such as Condition 7 are found 
in almost every automobile insurance contract writ-
ten in this Country. 
Respondent in this case and indeed the insur-
ance industry has a legal right to limit its liability 
providing that the limitation does not contravene es-
tablished statutory law or the public policy of the 
State. The foregoing principle was in effect adopted 
by the Utah Supreme Court in the case of Russell 
vs. Paulson, supra, as applied to the "excess clause" 
and "pro-rata clause" contained in the policies of 
different companies as applied to a single loss. The 
same reasoning of that case should apply in this case 
involving the limit of liability of an insurance com-
pany where two policies are issued by the same 
company. 
There is no evidence of a waiver by the insur-
ance Company of Condition 7 of the policy and no 
evidence that Condition 7 contravenes the Law or 
public policy of the State of Utah. In fact, the poli-
cies in question conform strictly to the Law of the 
State of Utah, and plaintiffs in this case have been 
afforded the protection required by the statute and in 
fact plaintiffs have been offered the fuU amount of 
money provided by Law. 
19 
The decision of the Lower Court must be 
affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
HANSON & GARRETT 
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